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L Introduction
One of the primary objectives expressed by the numerous negotiators' of
* B.A. Vassar, M.Sc. London School of Economics, M.A. & Ph.D. Harvard, J.D.
Columbia. Assistant Dean of International Programs and Graduate Legal Studies at Columbia
Law School.
1. The revision process of the Copyright Act began in 1961 and lasted for fifteen years.
Over the course of that decade and a half, representatives of authors, publishers, film and
recording companies, and other interested parties conducted numerous discussion sessions in
which they commented on a series of draft revisions of the Copyright Act. As the Supreme
Court remarked in Communityfor Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989),
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the 1976 Copyright Act 2 was to make transfers of copyright ownership more
transparent and unequivocally intentional. Working to counteract the
pernicious effect of doctrines such as "copyright indivisibility, 3 on authors,
which often caused the inadvertent loss of copyright rights, the drafters of the
Act undertook to ensure that transfers of ownership would be clearly
demarcated and always explicit. Accordingly, Section 204 of the 1976 Act
provides that transfers of copyright ownership 4 must be in writing; 5 this
requirement has become a tenet of U.S. copyright law.
Over the last several years, however, a number of decisions have
undermined the writing requirement, asserting that transfers of copyright
ownership may be made "by operation of law," 6 whether under other sections of
"The Act, which almost completely revised existing copyright law, was the product of two
decades of negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised
by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress."
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)).
3. The judicially created doctrine of indivisibility was borrowed from patent law, which
made an absolute distinction between an assignment (ownership interest) and a license (nonownership interest). See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing
Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1323, 1365-66 (2000) (discussing
patent and copyright indivisibility). Under this doctrine, the ownership of a copyright, like that
of a patent, could not be fragmented. Id. at 1366. In addition, in order to obtain federal
statutory copyright protection, publication of a work had to be accompanied by notice of
copyright in the name of the copyright owner. Notice in another's name would be defective and
inject the work into the public domain. See Michelle R. Heikka, The Inability of Copyright
Laws to Keep Pace with Technology: Will Greenberg v. National Geographic Stymie
Technology, or Can a Balance Be Struck?, 49 WAYNE L. REv. 145, 151 (2003) (discussing
difficulties in the indivisible copyright regime). The combined effect of indivisibility and
statutory notice requirements meant that if an author licensed a work to a publisher, and the
work was published, notice of copyright in the publisher's name would be ineffective. Id. Only
if the author assigned the entire work to the publisher would notice in the publisher's name
protect the work. Id. at 151 n.59. This created a difficulty for authors, who either were left with
no copyright protection if they merely licensed their works, or-if they assigned their works
with the understanding that the works would be assigned back after publication-found
themselves at the mercy of the publishers.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license,
or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or
place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.
Id.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000) ("A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by
operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of
the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly
authorized agent.").
6. Id.
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the Act, 7 in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, 8 or to satisfy the
requirements of state community property law. 9 In all of these cases, the Act's
fundamental commitment to explicit transfers is circumvented or compromised
in some way. As a result, the aggregation of these decisions constitutes a threat
to the Copyright Act's requirement of a writing for a valid transfer of copyright
ownership. This Article examines the cases and explains why their reasoning
subverts the policy decisions embedded in the 1976 Act and the writing
requirement it adopted.
Part II of the Article begins with a brief examination of transfers by
operation of law under the federal Copyright Act, including allocations of
ownership rights by statute in specific situations such as works for hire. Part III
then examines questionable judicial decisions that interpret federal and state
statutory provisions to accomplish unintended transfers of copyright ownership.
The decisions interpreting federal provisions fall into two categories:
misconstructions of the Copyright Act's provisions on transfers by operation of
law; and overly permissive interpretations of the Act's requirement of written
consent in asset transfer or bankruptcy situations. In both areas, the analysis
concludes that some recent decisions have overreached and allowed for
transfers where the Copyright Act arguably prohibits them. Shifting to the
state-federal law nexus, Part III then analyzes cases in which the Copyright
Act's ownership and transfer provisions have come into conflict with state
community property law. In particular, it criticizes two marital property
cases-Worth ° and Rodrigue"'-in which the California state courts and the
Fifth Circuit, respectively, decided that state community property law can
achieve a transfer of an author's copyright or expectation of income from his
copyright despite his refusal to agree to such a transfer. Part IV concludes that
the pattern formed by these cases undermines the 1976 Copyright Act's focus
on authorial control of copyright ownership and the benefits attendant to that
focus.

7. See, e.g., Tasini v. New York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
a transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law under Copyright Act §§ 201(c) and (d)).
8. See, e.g., ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding a transfer of copyright ownership through bankruptcy proceedings).
9. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding shared
copyright ownership through Louisiana's community property doctrine); In re Marriage of
Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136-37 (1987) (finding shared copyright ownership through
California's community property doctrine).
10. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987).
11. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
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II. The Statutory Setting: The Writing Requirement and CopyrightAct
ProvisionsAffecting Ownership Allocation

As mentioned, it is copyright dogma that a transfer of copyright ownership
requires a writing.12 The rationale for Copyright Act Section 204 is fairly
straightforward: "[s]ince transfers of copyright are important transactions and
are to be recorded, they should be required-as 'assignments' are now-to be
in writing and signed by the transferor.1 3 In short, Congress drafted Section
14

204 to prevent inadvertent or unintended losses of copyright by authors.
Other sections of the Copyright Act bear witness to similar intent, among them
Section 201(c), which allocates rights and privileges between authors who
contribute to collective works and the publishers who disseminate those
works.' 5 The Act's clear preference for express transfers is also demonstrated
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000) ("A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by
operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of
the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly
authorized agent.") For an analysis of some of the issues involved in this requirement, see
Robert A. Kreiss, The "In Writing" Requirementfor Copyright andPatent Transfers: Are the
Circuits in Conflict?, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 43, 48-50 (2000).
13. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the GeneralRevision of the U.S. Copyright
Law: HearingBefore the H.Comm. on the Judiciary,87th Cong. 95 (1961). As the Southern
District of New York said in Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 2d 259, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997): "In enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
strengthened protections for authors and created a legislative framework designed to prevent
unintended divestments of their rights. The Act reaffirms the principle that the 'author' is 'the
fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution."' See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
at 140 (1976) (discussing purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act). Thus, under both the 1909 and
1976 Copyright Acts, unless the author has given up his or her rights under copyright in a clear
and unequivocal manner, he or she retains those rights. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954) ("The clearest language is necessary
to divest the author of the fruits of his labor." (quoting Philipp v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 145
F. Supp. 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1956))); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087-88 (9th
Cir. 1989) (giving the author presumptive ownership of the copyright, absent a clearly indicated
desire to transfer); Cassway v. Chelsea Historic Props. I, L.P., 1993 Copyright L. Decisions
26,261, 26,264, available at 1993 WL 64633, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); Landon v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
14. In the course of the copyright law revision process, negotiators frequently made
statements that only an express transfer could be effective. See Alice Haemmerli, Commentary
on Tasini v. New York Times, 22 CoLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 129, 134-37(1998) (summarizing
the widespread belief in the necessity of an express transfer ofcopyright). As one contemporary
commentator put it, "I don't see why you can't have a statute of frauds here, like you do in any
other commercial transaction, requiring that any transfer of a right as important as this should be
in writing or it's not effective." Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the GeneralRevision of the Copyright Law: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary,88th Cong. 142 (1963).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) (assigning rights and privileges to authors and
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by Section 201 (e), which denies effect to involuntary transfers of copyright. 16
Yet the Copyright Act also provides, at Section 201(d), for the possibility of
transfers of copyright ownership "by operation of law," 7 and other parts of the
statute allocate copyright ownership in the absence of signed transfers. 8 What
does this signify? If an author does not expressly transfer her rights, are there
occasions when a transfer nonetheless occurs? If so, what are the limits of such
transfers?
Clearly, some tension exists between a statutory provision that requires a
writing-an unequivocally expressed signal of intent to transfer-and Section
201(d)'s statement that copyright may be transferred by operation of law,
presumably without any such manifestation of intent. One approach to
resolving that tension is to assert that a transfer of copyright ownership by
operation of law under the Copyright Act ultimately requires some prior sign of
assent to the transfer.' 9 That is, even if a transfer appears to be involuntarye.g., bankruptcy or foreclosure-it can be explained by saying that the author
has previously manifested consent by filing in bankruptcy or mortgaging her
publishers of multi-author works).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (e) (2000) (denying effect to involuntary transfers of copyright).
The subsection reads:
Involuntary Transfer.-When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or
of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other
official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights
of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under title 11.
Id.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d) (2000) (providing for transfer of copyright by operation of law).
Subsection (d) reads:
Transfer of Ownership.(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or
pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by
clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is
entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to
the copyright owner by this title.
Id.
18. For example, Section 201(b) provides for works for hire which do not require a
written transfer of authorship in the case of employees and Section 201(a) provides for coownership ofjoint works.
19. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (explaining how consent to transfer may
be informed in the work for hire context).
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copyright,20 and such evidence of consent to the eventual transfer has been
deemed critical. 2' Still, the fact remains that the classical example of a transfer
by operation of law is intestate succession.22 Given that this type of transfer by
definition occurs in the absence of a writing, 23 the question naturally arises
whether manifestation of intent is in fact crucial, and if so, whether it must
invariably be expressed in writing. As far as intestate succession is concerned,
the answer is rather obviously "no." But is intestate succession the sole
example of unintended, unwritten transfers? Or are others conceivable? And if
they exist, how far do they go? If other transfers by operation of law are valid,
they constitute a significant incursion into the Copyright Act's general
requirement that the intent of the author or copyright owner be unmistakably
and expressly demonstrated as a prerequisite to a valid transfer. The question,
therefore, is a very important one, and its answer depends upon whether such
transfers are consistent with the federal statute. It should be beyond debate
that-whatever one's attitude toward authorship-transfers of copyright
ownership that ignore the text or legislative intent of the 1976 Act are suspect
at best.24

At the outset, it is helpful to distinguish between what may be illicit
judicially-mandated transfers of ownership under the Copyright Act 25 and
allocations that are not only permissible but required by the Act.
20. See infra note 95 (discussing transfer of ownership in bankruptcy proceedings and
mortgage foreclosures). Although technically a copyright mortgage is a present transfer of
copyright ownership (see 17 U.S.C. § 101's definition of "transfer"), the irrevocable transfer to
the mortgagee would ordinarily be a subsequent eventuality triggered by the mortgagor's
default. That involuntary foreclosure would therefore be grounded in a prior voluntary
hypothecation.
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) (discussing the intersection of
mortgage and copyright ownership), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) (establishing transfer of copyright by succession);
Haemmerli, supra note 14, at 139 (discussing the legislative history of intestate transfer).
23. See, e.g., Range Rd. Music Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 375, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (asserting that under the intestacy statute, the right of inheritance is determined
by operation of law only if decedent failed to dispose of his property by will).
24. That is, one need not be an advocate of the so-called "Romantic author" to endorse an
approach that respects the text and legislative intent of the Copyright Act. (In fact, critics of
copyright somewhat overstate the notion of the "Romantic author." See Jane C. Ginsburg, The
ConceptofA uthorship in ComparativeCopyrightLaw, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 1063, 1065 (2003)
(discussing criticism of the "Romantic author").)
25. This Article does not address judicial decisions in infringement cases that merely
deprive a copyright owner of the benefits of his copyright. Although such a decision's ultimate
impact-no enforcement of the enjoyment of copyright rights in the dispute at hand-may be
similar to one that accomplishes a transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law, no
reallocation of rights occurs. In the infringement setting, when a court concludes that the
defendant's acts have not risen to the level of infringing the plaintiff's rights, the court has not
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A. Joint Ownership Under Section 201(a)
The Copyright Act provides in Section 201(a) that "[c]opyright in a
work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work. 2 6 Joint work decisions may convey the superficial impression of
reallocating ownership interests, because if a joint work is held to exist,
then co-ownership will flow with that determination and the joint work's
authors will be considered co-authors.2 7 One might therefore be tempted to
view an attribution of co-author status by a court as a transfer of copyright
ownership by operation of law, because as a result of the court's decision,
the original author will now have an equal partner who is a co-owner with
an undivided interest in the work.28 At the same time, however, once such
a determination is made, it is essentially a decision that the parties have
been co-owners ab initio, i.e., since the work was first created. In this case,
the situation does not in fact represent a transfer of ownership, but rather a
conclusion about the parties in whom initialownership vested. While this
distinction obviates the need for extended analysis of joint ownership, it
remains worth noting that when courts make decisions about such
ownership, they focus very strongly on intent. The determinative element
in these cases is evidence of intent to create a joint work 29 and to be a cotransferred those rights to the defendant; it has merely held that the plaintiff's rights were not
infringed and cannot be vindicated in the case at hand. Unless the court has found that the
plaintiff's copyright ownership is invalid, the plaintiff's failure to obtain relief leaves her
copyright ownership intact, including complete control over the enjoyment of her copyright
rights and their vindication when they are in fact infringed.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). Compare this provision with the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 116 (2000), which does not state that joint inventors are co-owners.
27. Co-authorship is implied in the statutory language's reference to "[t]he authors of a
joint work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
28. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (examining the issue ofcoauthorship). The case involved the dramaturg Lynn Thomson's claim to co-authorship of the hit
musical Rent.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) defines a joint work as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole." See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120, 121 (1976). The 1976 Act's
definition was crafted in part to reject common law doctrines holding that a joint work could be
created entirely in the absence of intent to do so, the so-called "Twelfth Street Rag doctrine."
The doctrine was based on a Second Circuit case, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955), modifiedon reh "g,223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), which
held that although the composer of a song created the music without any intention to have it
accompanied by lyrics and later assigned the music to a publisher who hired a lyricist, the
subsequent addition of the lyrics created a joint work. Id. at 570. This decision and the
resultant doctrine were widely criticized and the 1976 Act rejected them.
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author.3 ° If sufficient objective evidence demonstrates the requisite intent to
create a joint work, it is certainly conceivable that a court could determine the
existence of a joint work (and resultant co-ownership rather than exclusive
ownership) even where an author has not explicitly declared that she wants to
create a joint work. 3 1 A court will, however, focus on whether the facts show
that both authors of a putative joint work intended to share co-authorship and
co-ownership.
As a general matter, then, it is safe to say that even where there exists a
theoretical potential for a finding that authors have created a joint work, most

30. Although it is now well settled that an intent to create a joint work is a crucial
requirement of such a work, it is less obvious that the statute requires a mutual intention to share
co-authorship status. That requirement has, however, been read into the Act by the Second
Circuit as a means of limiting spurious claims and conferring co-author (and co-owner) status
only on those persons most "likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress."
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200
(reading intent into the show co-authorship requirement). Other courts have followed suit. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that a party
claiming co-authorship "must show the parties intended to be joint authors"); BTE v.
Bonnecaze, No. CIV.A. 97-3644, 1998 WL 800111, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 1998) (requiring
intent); Clogston v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 930 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (W.D. Tex.
1996) (same); Cabrera v. Teatro del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743,764 (D.P.R. 1995) (same).
The Second Circuit has also interpolated a requirement that each putative author make a
copyrightable contribution to the joint work, as another way of limiting unsubstantiated claims
to authorship. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 507 (requiring contribution from each author);
Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (same). This requirement was adopted rather than a "de minimis" test
that would have required only some contribution. See Balkin v. Wilson, 863 F. Supp. 523, 526
(W.D. Mich. 1994) (describing the test and citing decisions in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits).
Compare the independent copyrightability test with Patent Act Section 116, which reads,
"Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though.., each did not make the same type or
amount of contribution, or... each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every
claim .... " 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000). Asjoint inventors, contributors to a patent are considered
co-owners: "[I]n the context ofjoint inventorship, each co-inventor presumptively owns a pro
rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter what their [sic] respective contributions."
Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For a
critique of Ethicon and its implications, see Tigran Guledjian, Teaching the FederalCircuit
New Tricks: Updating the Law of Joint Ownership in Patents, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1273
(1999).
31. Despite Thomson's emphasis on "factual indicia of ownership and authorship,"
Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201, and that of the cases cited in Thomson dealing with "objective
indices of co-authorship intent," id. at 201 n.17, some authors have criticized the courts for
relying too heavily on subjective perceptions and their outward manifestation. That is, some
would give as much weight to an author's use of another's material as to his statements about
his intent. See, e.g., Faye Buckalew, Joint Authorship in the Second Circuit: A Critiqueof the
Law in the Second Circuit Following Childress v. Taylor and as Exemplified in Thomson v.
Larson, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 545, 574-76 (1998) (criticizing the Second Circuit's emphasis on
author intent in Thomson v. Larson).
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courts insist on evidence of intent to trigger that conclusion. In the absence of
such evidence, the decision to find co-authorship would arguably be tantamount
to a judicial transfer of ownership from the actual author to the claimant author
that would run afoul of Copyright Act Section 201 (e).32
B. Compulsory Licenses
In contrast, the statutory or judicial use of compulsory licenses 33 to ensure
dissemination of works to the public does not appear to create any difficulties
in terms of Section 201 (e) and its strictures against involuntary transfers. For
example, in the landmark Rear Window case, Abend v. MCA, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held that although the derivative film version of the plaintiff's story
could not be further exploited without infringing the plaintiff's renewal
copyright,35 this did not mean that no further exploitation could occur. The
defendant's substantial investment in the film, the role of new versus
underlying matter in the film's success, the need for the derivative work owner
to be able to enjoy the fruit of its own labor, and the public interest in continued
access to the film all contributed to the court's refusal to grant an injunction.
Instead, the court viewed damages as the appropriate remedy.36 Similarly, in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,3 7 the Supreme Court stated that even
where a parodist has exceeded the bounds of fair use, damages, rather than

32. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2000) (limiting transfersof copyright ownership); infranotes
89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and development of 17 U.S.C. § 201 (e)).
33. The Copyright Act provides for compulsory licenses at several sections. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. §§ 114-15, 203, 304 (2000) (providing for compulsory licenses).
34. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), affd sub nom., Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). The case involved a suit by the copyright owner of the story on
which the film Rear Window was based. Id. at 1467. The successors of the story's author, who
were found to have retained his rights in the renewal term of the story's copyright, sought to
prevent the film's producers from continuing to exploit that derivative work. Id. at 1468. The
Supreme Court, affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision, held that the author's successors' rights
were valid and that the producers were not entitled to continue exhibiting the film but did not
address the compulsory license issue, stating that the remedy (discussed at length in the Ninth
Circuit's opinion) was not relevant to the issue on which it had granted certiorari. Stewart,495
U.S. at 216.
35. A bend, 863 F.2d at 1478. The plaintiff, as copyright owner, had the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works of his story under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
36. The Abend court referred with approval to Professor Nimmer's recommendation of
damages or continuing royalties under certain circumstances. See Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479
(citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B] (1988)).
37. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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injunctive relief, may more appropriately protect the public interest in the
availability of the secondary work.3
In these cases, one could say that the court's refusal to grant injunctive
relief for copyright infringement effectively results in a compulsory license in
favor of the defendant. At the same time, where a court has supported
continued exploitation of a derivative work, 39 as in Abend, or implied that it
may be permissible under certain circumstances, as in Campbell, the
exploitation in question does not entail any transfer of copyright ownership.4 °
At most, the secondary work producer receives the equivalent of a nonexclusive
license under which it is financially liable to the copyright owner.
C. Workfor Hire Under Section 201(b)
Works made for hire under the Copyright Act may be works "prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment"' 1 or limited types of
specially commissioned works produced by non-employee independent
contractors under written agreements.42 The question of transfers by operation of
38. Id.at 578 n.10.
39. Continued exploitation in the termination and renewal contexts is codified by the
Copyright Act at Sections 203(b)(1) and 304(a)(4)(A), respectively.
40. The same reasoning applies to Sections 203 and 304, which allow existing derivative
work owners to continue to exploit their works even after the original grant from the copyright
owner has been terminated or expired. Although one could plausibly argue that this interferes
with the owner's copyright by making it more difficult to license derivative work rights in
general, and impossible to license them exclusively, it still does not constitute a formal transfer
of copyright rights.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "work made for hire"). The definition reads:
A "work made for hire" is-( 1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a
"supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to
a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating,
explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work,
such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial
notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes,
and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work
prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
Id.
42. Id. The writing in this case must be signed by both parties.
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law arises only in the employment situation because the writing mandated by
Copyright Act Section 101(2) for works produced by independent contractors
clearly serves a similar purpose to the writing required for an assignment of
copyright ownership 43 in terms of manifesting assent to a transfer of rights.44 It
must be emphasized, however, that the identification of a work as a work for hire
has more drastic consequences than a mere transfer of ownership rights: the
hiring party is deemed to be the author of the work, not merely its copyright
owner. 45 This raises some interesting doctrinal questions.
According to Nimmer, it would be unconstitutional for the Copyright Act
simply to strip authorship from a creator and to bestow it upon an employer
unless one can infer an implied agreement by the author that this should occur.46
Such an inference is made possible by the Act's inclusion of the statement in
Section 201(b) that despite the presumption that an employer or hiring party is
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000) (requiring a writing for assignment of copyright).
44. With regard to independent contractors, the timing of the signed agreement is a
critical issue. In Schiller & Schmidt v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992), the
Seventh Circuit held that "the writing must precede the creation of the property in order to serve
its purpose of identifying the (non-creator) owner unequivocally" and that "the signed-statement
requirement in Section 101 (2) has a second purpose-to make the ownership of property rights
in intellectual property clear and definite, so that such property will be readily marketable." Id.
at 412. This interpretation of the timing question appears more consonant with the Supreme
Court's holding in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), than
that of some other courts, such as the Second Circuit's holding in PlayboyEnters. v. Dumas, 53
F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995), which found that a writing can follow the creation of a work if an oral
agreement preceded it. Given the need for predictability emphasized by the Supreme Court in
C.C.N.V., it would appear obvious that the decision as to whether a work is expected to be a
work made for hire ought to be made prior to its creation, so that both parties have a clear idea
as to where the copyright will reside. The Copyright Act's author-protective rules requiring that
both parties sign a work-for-hire agreement, in contrast to Section 204's requirement that the
author alone sign a transfer, is evidence that Congress valued certainty on this question. Hence,
Schiller appears to reflect the better view as far as the timing of a work-for-hire agreement is
concerned.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (establishing the hiring party as the author). The
subsection reads:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. In making the hiring party the author, Section 201(b) eliminates the original author's
termination rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000) (expressly disqualifying works made for
hire from the usual procedures of author termination rights). It is worth noting that in the workfor-hire situation contemplated by Section 101 (2), both parties must sign the writing.
46. See 1 MELVILLE B. NiMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 6A.03[C][2][a] (2006) [hereinafter NIMMER] (discussing the constitutional limits of the work
for hire doctrine).
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considered the author of a work made for hire, the parties may agree otherwise.47
Thus, by failing to so provide, an author impliedly agrees to a work for hire
"transfer" of authorship rights. 48 Consequently, the work for hire provision's
legislative allocation of authorship (and ownership) to the employer is conceived
as a transfer requiring the consent of the author, and such consent is inferred from
the absence of the optional agreement to arrange matters otherwise. Following
this line of reasoning, Nimmer cites Judge Friendly's dissent in Scherr v.
UniversalMatch Corp.49 In Scherr, the Second Circuit held with respect to the
1909 Copyright Act that the Act created a rebuttable presumption that an
employee's work vested in the employer. 50 In dissent, Judge Friendly expressed
doubts that a statutory provision securing exclusive copyright rights to nonauthors would be consonant with the Constitution's copyright clause, which
"authorizes the enactment of legislation securing 'authors' the exclusive rights to
their writings." 5' He therefore suggested that for Section 26 of the 1909
Copyright Act to be constitutional, it would have to be "limited
to instances where
52
an assignment of future copyright may fairly be implied."
The Second Circuit later remarked in Childress v. Taylor53 that Judge
Friendly's reasoning appeared to be "more like a justification for transfer of
ownership than for recognition of authorship,, 54 and asserted that Congress'
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (allowing a written agreement to overcome the
presumption).
48. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 6A.03[C][2][a] (discussing the implied transfer
agreement); see also Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534,543 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'd,218
F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In a work made for hire situation, the employee's acceptance of
employment is deemed to be consent to the employer's ownership of copyrights in works
created by the employee.").
49. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 46, at § 6A.03[C][2][a] (citingScherrv.UniversalMatch
Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting)).
50. See Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500 (finding presumption that work vested in employer); see
also Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708,711 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Under the Copyright Act of 1909...
there is a rebuttable presumption that when an employer hires an employee or independent
contractor to produce work of an artistic nature, the employer owns the copyright in the work.").
The Ninth Circuit went on to explain that the presumption is one as to the "mutual intent of the
parties." Id.
51. Scherr,417 F.2d at 502 (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id.(Friendly, J., dissenting).
53. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. Id.at 506 n.5. The distinction between authorship and ownership is a valid one, but it
has not become clearer over the years. For example, Nimmer is cited as saying not only that
"the proviso that 'the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the "author" for purposes of this title' is not subject to variation by agreement between the
parties" but also that "an employer and an employee [are not] precluded... from agreeing that
the copyright in the resulting work shall vest in the employee." Foraste v. Brown Univ., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 238-39 (D.R.I. 2003) (citations omitted). "Vesting" generally refers to
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decision to confer authorship status on employers is not constitutionally suspect. 5"
This seems to miss Friendly's point. He is essentially saying that there must, at a
minimum, be a justification for recognition of authorship in the employer, and
that the justification in question is the implied intentional transfer of ownership by
the employee.16 Nor does the Childresscourt's statement about constitutionality
add much to the conversation; it is conclusory. On the whole, therefore, the point
made by Judge Friendly is rather persuasive. Unless an author has evinced some
willingness that the employer receive authorial status, the endowment of a nonauthor with authorship might indeed be vulnerable to attack on both constitutional
and Section 201 (e) grounds. By accepting employment and eschewing a written
agreement to the contrary, however, an author may be said to have demonstrated
57
such consent under the 1976 Act, at least insofar as Section 201 (b) is concerned.
I1. Court-MandatedCopyright Transfers
A. Decisions Under the CopyrightAct
1. Sections 201(c) and (d)
In 1997, the Southern District of New York held in Tasini v. New York
Times58 that despite an absence of voluntary copyright transfers by the plaintiff
freelance authors to the defendant publishers, the publishers had been given the
right to sell the authors' articles to Mead Corporation for inclusion in the
authorship, not mere ownership, hence the two statements taken together are confusing. The
Foraste court declined the plaintiff's invitation to view authorship and ownership under
Copyright Act Section 201 (b) as sufficiently distinct to permit a transfer of copyright ownership
back to the employee under Section 201(a) rather than under the stricter requirements of
Section 201 (b).
55. Childress,945 F.2d at 506 n.5.
56. As suggested supra note 54, this conclusion admittedly conflates ownership and
authorship to some extent by using an implied agreement to an ownership transfer as a surrogate
for an implied agreement to authorship vesting. Nonetheless, it has at least the value of
focusing on intent.
57. This does not address the issue of whether or when a creating party should be deemed
an "employee" for purposes of Copyright Act § 101(1). That determination is a complex one
depending on many factors, beginning with those articulated by the Supreme Court in
Communityfor Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989), and later refined
by lower courts. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining and applying the C.C.N. V. factors). Given the drastic effects of a work being
deemed work for hire, it is obviously of crucial importance that the determination be made in a
painstaking manner.
58. Tasini v. New York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 206 F.3d 161
(2d Cir. 2000), aftd, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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LexisNexis database. 59 The court justified its conclusion by finding that the
authors' copyrights had been partially transferred to the publishers "by operation
of law"60 as a function of the print publishers' statutory privilege to publish
revisions of their periodicals. 6' Reading Copyright Act Sections 201(c) 62 and
201 (d) 63 "in tandem," 64 the court declared: "Section 201(c) transfers plaintiffs'
copyrights 'in part' to defendants-a permissible exercise under Section
are left with full
201 (d)(1 )-and therefore, under Section 201 (d)(2), defendants
65
authority over the 'subdivision' of rights they acquire.,
Section 201 (c) provides that when authors of contributions to a collective
work have not expressly transferred their copyrights in those contributions (i.e.,
59. Id. at 823-24. As will be discussed later at greater length, the publishers had a limited
publishing privilege under Copyright Act Section 201 (c) to republish the articles as part oftheir
periodicals or revisions thereof. The publishers claimed that the sale to Mead was covered by
their revision privilege and that they sold their collective works, not the individual articles
written by plaintiffs.
60. Id.at 815.
61. In reversing, the Second Circuit deemed it unnecessary to analyze the issue ofwhether
the publishers' privilege was transferable or effected a transfer by operation of law. The
Supreme Court similarly declined to address that question. For this reason, the district court's
conclusions on the matter have been undisturbed and have recently been endorsed in another
Southern District of New York decision, Faulkner v. National Geographic Society, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 523, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
62. Section 201(c) reads:
Contributions to Collective Works. Copyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and
vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of any express
transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision
of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
63. Section 201(d) reads:
Transfer of Ownership. (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession. (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as
provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular
exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
64. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 815.
65. Id. The court also noted that the "recognition [in Section 201 (d)] ofthe potential for a
partial transfer of copyright 'by operation of law' follows from the fact that exactly such a
transfer is effected in the preceding section of the Act, Section 201 (c), which extends certain
enumerated 'privileges' to publishers." Id.
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by written agreement as required by the Copyright Acte6 ), then the collective
work publisher is given "only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the
contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the same series., 67 In effect,
the Tasini district court decided that, by virtue of their publishing privilege, the
publishers were granted an involuntary transfer of copyright by operation of
law-a transfer that they could reconvey to a third party.68
The characterization of the publishers' privilege as a transfer of copyright
rights was pivotal to the district court's holding. If, as the plaintiff authors
contended, the publishers' privilege was no more than a permit or nonexclusive
license, then the publishers did not enjoy an ownership right in the articles that
they could legitimately reconvey to Mead.69 Under the Copyright Act, a
nonexclusive license does not qualify as a transfer of copyright ownership.70 In
the absence of an ownership interest, a nonexclusive licensee holds only a
permit to use without being held liable for infringement. That permit is
personal and nontransferable. 7 ' If, on the other hand, the publishers' privilege
rose to the level of a transfer of copyright ownership, then they were entitled to
reconvey that property right to a third party.72 Thus, whether the publishers
enjoyed a transfer of rights was a crucial question, and one that the court
answered in the affirmative despite the defendants' concession that their license
was nonexclusive.7 3
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000) (requiring a writing).
67. Id. § 20 1(c).
68. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 815; see also Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 523,546 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting an involuntary transfer of copyright with a right to
reconvey).
69. Cf Ilyin v. Avon Publishers, 144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (finding that a
collective work publisher's publication privilege under the 1909 Act was not transferable to a
third party).
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (dating transfer of ownership). The Copyright Act's
definition of transfer does not include nonexclusive licenses. Id.
71. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
nonexclusive licenses are personal and nontransferable) (citing Harris v. Emus Records Corp.,
734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984)); SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-1079,
1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991) (discussing non-transferability of a
nonexclusive license); Avon Publishers, 144 F. Supp. at 372 (finding that a collective work
publisher's publication privilege under the 1909 Act was not transferable to a third party); In re
Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing ownership as
the "sine qui non of the right to transfer").
72. That is, unless one were to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Gardnerv.
Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002), which limited publishers ability to sub-license works.
73. The defendants, who emphasized the Copyright Act's media-neutrality, agreed that the
publishers had received a nonexclusive electronic publishing license. The district court record

1026

63 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1011 (2006)

It would appear tenuous to hold, without supporting evidence, that authors
who have withheld consent to transfers of copyright can be viewed as impliedly
consenting to such transfers by agreeing to a situation that does not involve a
transfer.7 4 Nevertheless, the district court seems to have built on suggestions in
the defendants' briefs that Section 201(c) entails a statutory transfer of
copyright rights. The defendants variously referred to the Section 201(c)
privilege as a set of rights "acquired by... force of law 7 5 or as an "automatic
statutory transfer of reproduction and distribution rights. 7 6 The court
apparently absorbed these notions in arriving at its (somewhat truncated)
explanation of how the combined workings of Copyright Act Sections 201 (c)
and 201 (d) accomplished an involuntary transfer of rights to the publishers.
Although the court justified its conclusion by reference to transfers by
operation of law, the history and meaning of such copyright transfers were not
reads:
The Court: [D]o you concede[, Mr. Keller, attorney for defendants,] that an author
who gives an article to a newspaper like The New York Times... retains the right
to take that article and have it published in a different methodology if he chose to?
Mr. Keller [attorney for defendants]: Absolutely. In fact, your Honor, there is
testimony in the record that every single one of the plaintiffs did that.
The Court: They retained that right?
Mr. Keller: Absolutely.
The Court: Could they, if they chose, sell their individual article to NEXIS?
Mr. Keller: Yes, they could.
Brief for the Respondents at *19, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00201) (citing transcript of oral argument before the district court). The defendants'
characterization of the publishers' privilege as nonexclusive is inconsistent both with a claim to
copyright ownership and with the district court's conclusion that there was a transfer of
ownership by operation of law. If authors could sell their articles to Lexis for electronic
publication, then they could not have transferred the electronic publishing rights in the articles
to the New York Times; any electronic rights sold to the Times would have had to be
nonexclusive and therefore could not constitute a transfer. See Haemmerli, supra note 14, at
135-37 (contrasting "privilege" and "transfer" in the Copyright Act).
74. The court seems to have believed that such consent could be inferred by virtue of the
plaintiff authors having agreed to the publication of their articles in discrete issues of the
defendants' publications. But because these authors had refused or failed to execute written
transfers of copyright for such purpose and had agreed to publish only on a non-transfer basis, it
is implausible to argue that they had impliedly agreed to those very transfers. Rather, the
natural conclusion is that they had agreed only to the publication of their articles in the issues in
question (or at most, in the manner described in Section 201(c)) and not to further uses that
would depend on the publishers having obtained transfers of copyright ownership.
75. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
Tasini v. New York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93-8678).
76. Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Tasini v. New
York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93-8678).
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briefed by the litigants in the case, nor were those questions posed in oral
argument." Subsequent decisions that have endorsed the district court's
holding have been equally cursory in their approach. In Ryan v. Carl,78 the
court remarked that the Tasini district court had "persuasively rejected" the
argument that the Section 201 (c) privilege was a non-transferable exemption
from liability, but it offered no rationale for its approval.79 More recently, the
Southern District of New York reaffirmed that the Tasini court considered the
statute and its legislative history in concluding that the privilege was
transferable, and that "no purpose would be served by repeating that
analysis" 8 0-- despite the absence of argument on the subject. This uncritical
acceptance of the Tasinicourt's conclusions is therefore doubly disturbing. In
fact, not only is it difficult to justify such transfers by reference to the text and
legislative history of Sections 201(c) and 201(d)
of the Copyright Act, but
8
Section 201(e) of the Act denies them effect. '
The precursor to Copyright Act Section 201 (d) (drafted during the lengthy
copyright revision process of the 1960s) referred to the divisibility of copyright
and the ability to transfer copyright in part or in whole; this was intended as8a2
corrective to the pernicious judicial doctrine of copyright indivisibility.

77. Oral argument before the Second Circuit (Miner, Winter, and Pooler, JJ.) took place
on April 26, 1999. As noted, the defendants referred to a statutory grant in their briefs, but this
was more by way of asserting that Section 201 (c) granted transferable rights than by elaborating
on the concept of transfer by operation of law.
78. Ryan v. Carl, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
79. Id. at 1150.
80. Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
81. See infra notes 91-93, 100 and accompanying text (discussing common law and
legislative history bases for Section 201(e)'s limitations on nonbankruptcy involuntary transfers
by operation of law).
82. See Haemmerli, supra note 14, at 132-34, 139. Under the doctrine of copyright
indivisibility, described more fully later, an author often lost the copyright in his work if he
depended on the collective work's copyright notice. The Copyright Act of 1909 required that
copyright notice be provided in the name of the owner of a published work in order to preserve
the copyright in the work. If the author had granted only a license to the collective work
publisher while retaining copyright ownership, the publisher's collective work copyright notice
would be defective as to the author's contribution because it was not in the copyright owner's
name; the contribution would then be injected into the public domain. The revised copyright
bill aimed to cure this problem by clarifying that copyrights could be divided, and that an author
could make a partial transfer of copyright ownership for purposes of publication in a collective
work without affecting his ownership or the exploitation of his work in other media. The
precursor to Section 201(d) was Section 14 of the 1964 preliminary draft bill. See Preliminary
Draftfor Revised United States Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 15 (1964) [hereinafter 1964
Preliminary Draft].
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Another section of the draft revision bill provided for transfers of copyright 3 by
The two concepts of
various means, including intestate succession."
divisibility and transferability were ultimatelyjoined in Section 201(d), and the
words "by operation of law" added to the 1964 bill.8 5 During this process, no
suggestion was made that the phrase "by operation of law" would endow a
court with the ability to mandate an involuntary transfer of copyright.8 6 Nor
was Section 201 (d) ever read this way prior to Tasini.8 7 Section 201 (d) merely
states the possibility of copyright transfers by operation of law; it does not itself
authorize specific transfers such as the one initiated by the court in Tasini.
Reading Section 201(d) as itself achieving a transfer of copyright ownership
not only misconstrues that provision, but is at odds with its intrinsic context,
including Section 201(c). The wording and legislative history of Section
201(c) tell us that Congress intended to allow authors to publish in collective
works without having to transfer the copyright in their articles. For example,
the drafters of Section 201 (c) believed that "there should not be a presumption
of transfer of ownership, in the absence of an express transfer, of the right to
publish the contribution in a similar collective work."88 This statement is
representative of many made in the course of the revision process, and it simply
does not accommodate the Tasini court's reasoning.
2. Section 201(e)
In addition, the parallel development of Copyright Act Section 201(e)
during the copyright revision process makes it doubtful that a court could
legitimately mandate or infer a transfer by operation of law without the author's
consent. Section 201(e) of the Copyright Act provides:

83.

The section on transfers was Section 17. 1964 Preliminary Draft, supra note 82, at

16.
84.

Haemmerli, supra note 14, at 139.

85.

Id.

86. The melding of the 1964 draft bill's Section 14(d)(1) on divisibility and its Section 17
on transfers, along with the additional "by operation of law" phraseology, was characterized as
being made "simply for convenience and clarification, and to avoid duplication." Id.
87. Indeed, one authority says that "although Section 201(d) provides that a transfer of
ownership of copyright may be effectuated by 'operation of law' rather than by 'conveyance,'
such operation of law must be triggered by the express or implied consent of the author." 3
NIMMER, supra note 46, § 10.04.
88. 1964 Preliminary Draft, supra note 82, at 258; see also Haemmerli, supra note 14, at
131-38 (providing the legislative history of Section 201(c)).
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When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body
or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or
exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title,
except as provided under Title 11.89
It is true that Section 201(e) originated in concern over Soviet
expropriation of U.S. copyright holders' rights. Congress made it clear,
however, that the provision was to have broader relevance: "The provision is
no longer directed against foreign governments [alone] since the same principle
applies to the United States government."' 90 And, as one commentator has
remarked:
[Although] the only scenario in the legislators' minds seems to have been
one where the expropriating governmental unit keeps the copyright for
itself, [rather than] the... situation where the court forcibly transfers some
of an author's copyright interests ....that situation clearly falls within the
provision's broad language. 9'
Under the circumstances, if we assume that a federal court is a
governmental body,92 a judicial decision that transfers an author's copyright
89. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2000).
90. Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When An Author's MarriageDies: The Copyright-Divorce
Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 382, 385 (1990) (citing a letter from the Acting
Librarian of Congress to Hon. Peter W. Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee dated August
26, 1975). Nevins presents an interesting legislative history of Section 201(e).
91. Id.at386;seealsoVeeckv. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l., Inc., 293 F.3d 791,803 (5th
Cir. 2002) ("Section 201(e) of the Act reflects Congress's intention to protect copyrights from
involuntary appropriation by government entities."). In contrast, In re PeregrineEnt., 116 B.R.
194, 206 (C.D. Cal. 1990), concluded that Section 201(e) should be read as "dealing with
actions initiated by governmental bodies, not those in furtherance of private objectives," and
that it "has no application to governmental actions taken in the sphere of private law where the
government is merely enforcing private rights and is not the ultimate beneficiary." As one court
has remarked, however, the language of Section 201(e) and congressional comments to that
provision leave Peregrine'sinterpretation with very little support. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'don othergrounds, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000); see
also infra notes 174-93 and accompanying text (discussing Rodrigue further).
92. See, e.g., Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 822
(9th Cir. 2002) ("[The Supreme Court has] rejected Schmier's argument that he can establish
standing based solely on his interest in seeing the federal courts (among other governmental
bodies) 'perform [their] duties' and abide by the Constitution.") (emphasis added); Price v.
Time, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 (N.D. Ala. 2004) ("At common law, a reporter did not
possess a privilege to conceal the identity of confidential sources of information obtained in the
course of newsgathering activities, and could be compelled to disclose such sources in a legal
proceeding before a court, grandjury, or other governmentalbody.") (emphasis added).
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without his or her consent-unless in the course of foreclosure or bankruptcy
proceedings-may well be invalid under Section 201(e).9 3 At the very least, as
Nimmer says, the provision "raises the question of its possible impact on
domestic transactions such as attachments pursuant to judicial proceedings, the
rights of unpaid sellers to reclaim property, etc." 94 At first glance, that issue
even appears perplexing in the bankruptcy context despite the provision's
reference to Title 11. Because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code turns on
whether a bankruptcy petition is filed voluntarily or involuntarily, Section
201(e)'s generalized reference to "Title 11" raises the question whether it
would permit a court-ordered transfer of copyright ownership in the context of
an involuntary bankruptcy. Bankruptcy was cited by the drafters of the original
text of Section 201(e) as a situation that would not fall within the scope of its
proscriptions, because they viewed filing in bankruptcy as evidence of an
author's consent to seek protection and make his copyrights available to the
estate. 95 When bankruptcy is involuntary, however, that consent is
conspicuously absent. Thus, the question arises whether the amendment of
Section 201 (e) to include a reference to "Title 11" was intended to broaden the
scope of the bankruptcy exception to include involuntary, as well as voluntary,
93. Two issues relating to the provision's phraseology arise here. First, in accomplishing
an involuntary transfer, is a court "purporting" to transfer copyright rights, and if not, does that
mean that its act does not fall within the ambit of Section 201(e)? Given the thrust of
Section 201 (e) and its legislative history, if merely purporting to transfer rights is sufficient to
trigger Section 201 (e), then, afortiori,actually transferring them ought to as well. The focus of
Section 201(e), after all, is on involuntary transfer. (None of the case law or commentary on
Section 201(e) distinguishes between purported acts and the acts themselves.) Second, because
the statute provides that an involuntary transfer shall not be given effect, one might say that an
involuntary transfer is invalid, rather than prohibited. Nevertheless, whether the transfer is
invalid (i.e., not to be given effect) under the terms of Section 201 (e) or deemed to conflict with
the statute, it would, in either case, presumably be unenforceable. And, either way, it would be
an illicit act for a court to undertake.
94. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 10.04.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 201(e)). The
legislative history states:
The purpose of this subsection is to reaffirm the basic principle that the United
States copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot
be taken away by any involuntary transfer ....Traditional legal actions that may
involve transfer of ownership, such as bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage
foreclosures, are not within the scope of this subsection; the authors in such cases
have voluntarily consented to these legal processes by their overt actions-for
example, byfiling in bankruptcy or by hypothecating a copyright.
Id.(emphasis added). As Nimmer says, the provision "would not inhibit transfers of ownership
pursuant to proceedings in bankruptcy and mortgage foreclosures, since in such cases the
author, by his overt conduct in filing in bankruptcy, or hypothecating a copyright, has consented
to such a transfer." 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 10.04.
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bankruptcy as an exception to the provision's restriction of involuntary
transfers.
Whether Section 201(e) would permit a transfer in this situation is a
function of the Copyright Act, rather than the Bankruptcy Code. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, in order to determine whether an asset is accessible to
unsecured creditors or whether it is exempt, one is remitted to non-bankruptcy
law. 96 Here, the relevant non-bankruptcy law is the Copyright Act, and the
relevant question is whether a creditor with a judicial lien (i.e., a lien on the
debtor's property obtained in satisfaction of a judgment against the debtor)
would be able to seize the debtor's copyright under that statute. Section
201 (e)'s amended reference to "Title 1 "-comprising both voluntary and
involuntary bankruptcies-rather than "bankruptcy"-might (given the use of
"bankruptcy" to denote voluntary proceedings in Section 201(e)'s original
legislative history) mean that Congress intended to reach further than voluntary
bankruptcy. One cannot, however, read too much into the mere use of "Title
11" rather than "bankruptcy," because the mammoth Bankruptcy Reform Act of
197897 substituted references to the new Title 11 for references to "bankruptcy"
in many other federal statutes, raising the possibility that the change in
terminology was fairly nominal. It is therefore difficult to infer specific
congressional intent from the use of "Title 11" rather than "bankruptcy" in the
wording of Section 201(e).
As it turns out, however, there is no need to infer that intent, because it
was made explicit-not in the Copyright Act or its legislative history, but in the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Buried in the labyrinthine
depths of the House Report on that Act is the statement: "Section 313 of the
House amendment [which was the version Congress enacted] 98 amends Section
201(e) of the Copyright Act to permit a copyright to become property of the
96. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (2006) ("[A]n individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative,
paragraph (3) of this subsection."). Under subsection (3)(A), such property is, "subject to
subsections (o) and (p), any property that is exempt under Federal law." Id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
Subsection (c) then lists exceptions to the exemptions. The exceptions do not appear to apply to
copyrights, thereby necessitating consideration of federal copyright law's possible exemption of
copyrights from the estate.
97. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C. 101, et seq.).
98. The title of the Report reads as follows: "P.L. 95-598, BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT OF 1978/SEE PAGE 92 STAT. 2549/ HOUSE REPORT (JUDICIARY COMMITTEE)
NO. 95-595, SEPT. 8, 1977/(TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8200)/SENATE REPORT (JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE) NO. 95-989, JULY 14, 1978/(TO ACCOMPANY H.R.S. 2266) .... THE
HOUSE BILL WAS PASSED IN LIEU OF THE SENATE BILL AFTER AMENDING ITS
LANGUAGE TO CONTAIN MUCH OF THE TEXT OF THE SENATE BILL ......
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estate in an involuntary case." 99 Thus, even with regard to individual authors
who have not previously transferred their copyrights, it is clear that Section
201(e) of the Copyright Act permits involuntary transfers in the bankruptcy
setting. With respect to all other involuntary transfers by the authors covered
by Section 201(e), however, the provision retains its force. 00
3. Transfers of Copyright by Operationof Law in Asset Transfer Situations
The case law addressing transfers of copyright ownership by operation of
law in situations involving mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies is relatively
meager. A number of cases suggest that transfers of copyright by operation of
law in such contexts should not be expansively defined or assumed to be
statutorily acceptable. In Brooks v. Bates, l° a Southern District of New York
case, the plaintiff alleged infringement of copyrighted software created and
supposedly transferred to it by the defendant. The court stated that "the lessons
to be drawn from Professor Nimmer are that transfers of copyright by operation
of law are limited in number, and depend upon circumstances which establish
the author's express or implied consent."'0 2 It then held that the defendant's
copyrights had not been transferred to the plaintiff by operation of law.
Other authority suggests similarly that transfers by operation of law occur
only in limited circumstances, such as when a corporation transfers its assets to
its shareholders or to another corporation. °3 In the Southern District of New
York, even this situation has been read narrowly, and corporate succession has
not been viewed as necessarily resulting in a transfer of copyright ownership by
operation of law. In H.K.Co. v. Mori Lee Associates, Inc., 104 the court held
that when the copyright owner became a subsidiary of another company, its
copyright assets were not transferred to the other company (or to that
99. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 549 (1977).
100. Hence, for authors like the freelancers in Tasini who have not previously transferred
their works by exclusively licensing or assigning them, Section 201(e) would appear to preclude
non-bankruptcy involuntary transfers by operation of law and to invalidate the conclusion
reached by the district court in that case. See supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text
(discussing the Tasinidecision's impact on copyright law).
101. Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
102. Id. at 205. Brooks was, obviously, not taken into consideration by the Tasini district
court.
103. See Fantasy v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aft'd,984 F.2d
1524 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on othergrounds, 509 U.S. 517 (1994) (stating that a shareholder
who acquired corporate assets by operation of law was the legal owner of a copyright).
104. H.K. Co. v. Mori Lee Assoc., Inc., No. 85 Civ. 9929, 1989 WL 297953 (S.D.N.Y.
June 28, 1989).
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company's successor) by operation of law; the court was unwilling to assume
that such a transfer occurred solely by virtue of corporate reorganization.10 5
In contrast, a recent case in the Eighth Circuit'0 6 appeared to conclude the
opposite. On closer analysis, however, one sees that it did not really address
the problem. The court was presented with the question of whether the
appellee was the owner of copyrights in greeting card designs by virtue of a
transfer by operation of law. The author of the cards,'0 7 Creative Card, was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of AP&P, a firm that had filed for bankruptcy. AP&P
entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Taylor, selling assets "used in
the operation of [its] business,"'10 8 which it defined as "the business of
designing and publishing greeting cards, as currently conducted by the Creative
Card division ....,109 The agreement also transferred "all intellectual property
."10 Taylor sued Four Seasons, a
of the Business, including... copyrights ....
company formed by Creative Card's former president, for copyright
infringement when Four Seasons sold cards similar to designs previously
produced for Creative Card and transferred by AP&P to Taylor. When Four
Seasons challenged Taylor's ownership of the copyrights, the court held that
although there was no writing expressly transferring the copyrights from the
original "author" (i.e., Creative Card) to AP&P or to Taylor, the asset
agreement between AP&P and Taylor and the bankruptcy court's order
approving that agreement effected a transfer of the Creative Card copyrights to
Taylor."' Emphasizing the critical importance of "express or implied
consent"11 2 to a transfer by operation of law, the court relied on two other cases
to conclude that the bankruptcy court's order approving the Asset Purchase
Agreement "constituted a transfer of the copyrights 'by operation of law.""'13
Citing the definition of the "business" in the Agreement, as well as its explicit
mention of the intellectual property of the business, the court held that the
105. Id. at *2 n.3.
106. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005).
107. That is, the company that was the author by virtue of the Copyright Act's work-madefor-hire rules under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
108. Taylor Corp., 403 F.3d at 961.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 962. Noteworthy here is the lack of clarity in the court's reference to the
"transfer of Creative Card's copyrights to Taylor" without reference to the intermediate question
of the transfer from Creative Card to the holding company, or alternatively, the holding
company's status as copyright owner based on it wholly owning the subsidiary "author."
112. Id. at 963. Here, the court cited Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
which in turn cited Professor Nimmer's work.
113. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2005).
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bankruptcy court's order approving
the Agreement vested Taylor with
4
copyrights."1
the
of
ownership
Assuming that AP&P was indeed the owner of Creative Card's copyrights
by virtue of the latter's status as a wholly owned subsidiary, one may well
question whether it is appropriate to characterize-as the courts in Taylor didas a transfer by operation of law a transfer that has been memorialized in an
agreement signed by a willing seller and buyer, even if it occurs within a
bankruptcy proceeding and is approved by a court. In the other cases on which
the district court relied, the facts were equally reflective of a conscious bargain,
rather than a true transfer by operation of law. 1 5 As for the cases supporting
the Eighth Circuit's decision, they too were not altogether in agreement about
transfers by operation of law. In Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program
Radio Corp.,116 the real issue was whether the chain of title to copyrighted
materials was clear and valid; the court found that it was because each time
there was an inter- or intra-corporate transfer, title was properly executed and
recorded." 7 Only in Fantasy v. Fogerty' 8 was a true transfer by operation of
law asserted. However, in this case, where the assets of a dissolving
114. Id. This echoed the district court's ruling that the order of the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court "vested [the later appellee] with title to all the assets" in the Purchase Agreement, and that
the copyrights were "thereby transferred... 'by operation of law' within the meaning of 17
U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000)." Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, No. 01-1293, 2003 WL
23527789, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 2003). The court also noted that:
[T]he Copyright Act contemplates transfers of copyright ownership 'by operation
of law' .... Courts and commentators have recognized that such transfers include
transfers within the context of a bankruptcy .... Transfers in bankruptcy do not
run afoul of the Act's prohibition of involuntary transfers because the debtor
impliedly consents to the transfer through his act of filing bankruptcy.
Id. Neither the Eighth Circuit nor the district court, however, devoted any attention to the initial
ownership of the copyright by the transferor as the owner of the subsidiary that was the original
"author."
115. In John G. Danielson,Inc., v. Winchester-ConantProps., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.
Mass. 2002), the court referred to a transfer by operation of law, but its holding was squarelyand explicitly-based upon a contractual transfer as the defendant did not argue that the
copyright in the drawings at issue here was transferred "by operation of law." Id. at 11 n. 1.
Similarly, Time, Inc. v. Kastner,972 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) turned on whether there was
a valid contractual transfer of copyright to the plaintiff. Id. at 238. The court did mention that
under the Copyright Act a transfer is valid only if in writing or by operation of law, but that is
merely a restatement of the statutory rule. The court also cited Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp.
202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) for the requirement that a transfer by operation of law requires evidence of
express or implied consent. Id.
116. Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1994).
117. Id.at721.
118. Fantasy v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd 984 F. 2d 1524 (9th
Cir. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
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corporation were transferred to its shareholders by operation of law, "19 the court
relied entirely on state law and authority for the proposition that such a transfer
occurred. 20 It did not discuss in any way the relationship between such
transfers and the Copyright Act, nor did either of the cases it cited involve
copyrights. 121 On the whole, then, the landscape of transfers by operation of
law in asset transfer situations appears rather sparsely populated. Where the
cases do engage the subject of the permissibility of such transfers, they
consent by the copyright
generally limit them to circumstances that evince some
22
owner to the transfer, or to its eventual occurrence.
A different position was taken in 2003 by Judge Posner in ITOFCA, Inc.
v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc.,123 a Seventh Circuit case involving software
rights sold as assets of a bankrupt company ("ICI") to the predecessor-ininterest of the defendant.' 24 The disputed assets included the right to make and
sell modified copies of a computer program developed by the plaintiff. 125 The
126
plaintiff had transferred all of its assets except for cash and a building to ICI.
119. Id.at 1356.
120. Id.at 1352-54.
121. Rather-see Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182 P.2d 182 (1947) and Brodie
v.Barnes, 132 P.2d 595 (1942)--they pertained to tomatoes and real estate, respectively.
122. Thus, when a copyright owner has refused to transfer copyright ownership expressly,
courts have rejected the possibility that a transfer by operation of law has occurred. For
example, in Pamfloffv. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Cal. 1992), the court
dismissed the plaintiff's theory that rights in musical compositions had been transferred to it by
operation of law. Id.at 938. The court also considered the argument that the plaintiffs should
be exempted from the writing requirement of Copyright Act Section 204(a). Id.at 937. The
court stated that it would not affirmatively transfer by operation of law the rights that belonged
to the defendant authors because Section 204(a) was intended to "prevent a copyright owner
from inadvertently transferring ownership rights." Id. at 935. The court referred to the
subversion of legislative goals and the absence of support in precedent or commentary for such
a court-dictated transfer. Id. at 937. Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
misconstrues Pamfiloff as holding that an oral contract alleged by plaintiffs was not itself a
transfer by operation of law. Id.at 206. Rather, Pamfiloffsaid that if a contract (even if oral)
was the basis of the alleged transfer, then the transfer could not be by operation of law. See
Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 939 (claiming valid contract prevents transfer of copyright by
operation of law). Nevertheless, Brooks is sound in its finding of the case before failing to
prove that the defendant had impliedly consented to a transfer by operation of law.
123. ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003).
124. Id. at 929. The bankrupt company, ICI, was a transferee of ITOFCA. ICI sold the
assets in question to Amerifreight, which in turn sold them to the defendant, MegaTrans. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id at 931. ICI was registered as a co-author of a modified version of the software in
1991, but the controversy appeared to stem from whether ICI had rights to modify and sell
copies of ITOFCA's original program; hence, the 1991 program appears to be irrelevant to the
resolution of the dispute. Id. at 929.
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At issue was whether the transfer to ICI gave it the right to modify and sell
copies of ITOFCA's program. 127 ITOFCA's transfer of assets to ICI specified
28
that it covered all assets "used and necessary" to the freighting business.
Because the bankruptcy court's order explicitly found that ICI retained a
nonexclusive right to sell additional copies of the software after the transfer of
its assets to the defendant's predecessor-in-interest, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that ICI "must have" received such a right from ITOFCA; according
to the court, had ICI enjoyed only the right to use the program (as ITOFCA
contended), the bankruptcy court would not have decided as it did that "ICI
and
129
its transferees must have hadmore than a license to use the software."'
The problem with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is twofold. First, it
relies on the conclusions of the bankruptcy court as incontestable, whereas the
factual question of what ICI received in the asset transfer from ITOFCA was
ambiguous. 130 Second, the court's reasoning is patently outcome-oriented. The
decision that the asset transfer included the right to make and sell copies hinges
on inferences from circumstances and business practice. That is, ITOFCA
"must have" meant to transfer the right not only to modify and use but to sell
the program:
[S]uppose that ICI or its successor wanted to license the modified work to a
customer. Did it have to get a license from ITOFCA to be allowed to do
this? ITOFCA... was a shell. How would it evaluate such a request?
Who would evaluate the request?
Would ICI have consented to have such
13 1
an albatross around its neck?
In other words, the court makes the leap from the program being usable by ICI
to it being marketable by ICI on the grounds of business necessity. From
enjoying a right to use and change the program, ICI now is cast in the role of a
business needing to sell it, or otherwise have an "albatross" with which to
contend.

127. Id.at931.
128. Id.at 938 (Ripple, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 932-42 (Ripple, J.,
concurring). As mentioned infra at note 164, ITOFCA's
failure to object to the bankruptcy court's conclusions acted as tacit authorization. Nonetheless,
the original agreement was ambiguous.
131. Id.at 932 (emphasis in original).
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Such reasoning, while hardly novel in the Seventh Circuit, 132 is not highly
persuasive, particularly since the court does not adduce evidence either that the
licensing of the software was essential to conducting a freighting business or
that both the rights to modify and distribute the software were transferred to
ICI. While the court notes that a transfer (the initial one from ITOFCA to ICI)
of all assets except cash and a building would probably comprise copyright
rights, it also concedes that copyright transfers must be in writing. 133 Of course,
the court also argues that whether the copyright in the program was transferred
is beside the point, as all that ICI needed (to be able legitimately to transfer the
right to sell a modified version of the program to MegaTrans' predecessor-ininterest) was the right to modify and distribute copies of the program itself.
And, since ICI's rights to do so were apparently nonexclusive,' 34 they
did not
36
35
have to be granted in writing,' as do exclusive copyright rights.1
On the other hand, the nonexclusivity of ICI's rights crops up after its
transfer to MegaTrans' predecessor-in-interest; ICI retained rights to sell to
others aside from that transferee. But whether ICI's rightsfrom ITOFCA were
nonexclusive is another matter, as they depended on an asset transfer that
132. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009,1013 (7th Cir. 1983)
(providing similar reasoning). In its opinion, the court writes:
The final argument of defendant's that we address is that selling plaintiff's
licensee's circuit boards that speed up the rate of play of plaintiff's video games is
not an infringement of plaintiff's copyrights. Speeding up the rate of play of a
video game is a little like playing at 45 or 78 revolutions per minute ("RPMs") a
phonograph record recorded at 33 RPMs. If a discotheque licensee did that, it
would probably not be an infringement of the record company's copyright in the
record. One might argue by analogy that it is not a copyright infringement for
video game licensees to speed up the rate of play of video games, and that it is not a
contributory infringement for the defendant to sell licensees' circuit boards that
enable them to do that. There is this critical difference between playing records at a
faster than recorded speed and playing video games at a faster than manufactured
rate: there is an enormous demand for speeded-up video games but there is little if
any demand for speeded-up records.... Speeding up a video game's action makes
the game more challenging and exciting and increases the licensee's revenue per
game .... Video game copyright owners would undoubtedly like to lay their
hands on some of that extra revenue and therefore it cannot be assumed that
licensees are implicitly authorized to use speeded-up circuit boards in the machines
plaintiff supplies.
Id.
133. See ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging the rule that copyright transfers must be written).
134. See id. at 930 (providing facts).
135. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72,74 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that
a nonexclusive copyright license does not require a writing nor even an explicit agreement).
136. See 17 U.S.C.§ 204(a) (2000) (requiring a writing).
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assets, except a building ...

and cash assets'

37

that

presumably included ITOFCA's copyrights. Either that transfer granted a
nonexclusive license to ICI (that did not need to be specified in writing) or it
assigned ITOFCA's copyrights (in which case a writing was required by the
Copyright Act).
If the initial transfer granted a nonexclusive license to ICI, then-at least
according to decisions to date in other circuits-ICI was probably not entitled
to reconvey its license to others, 138 and the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is at the
very least controversial. On the other hand, if ITOFCA's transfer to ICI
included a transfer of copyright, then it is debatable whether it was sufficiently
specific under Copyright Act Section 204 to be effective. On this point, the
139
ITOFCA court asserts that explicit mention of copyright is unnecessary,
citing its earlier opinion in Schiller & Schmidt v. Nordisco Corp.40 In Schiller
(another Posner opinion), the Seventh Circuit held that a sales agreement for
film negatives that did not mention "copyright" had to be interpreted as
transferring copyright along with the negatives because there otherwise would
be a standoff between the parties: The owner of the negatives would not be
able to make positives without a license, and the other party--even if it retained
copyright rights-could not make positives because it no longer possessed the
negatives.14' The sheer inefficiency of the resultant stalemate led Judge Posner
to reject the possibility that the parties had intended it: "An agreement that...
[and] we do not lightly assume
created such a stand-off would be inefficient...
42
that this is what the parties intended."'

137. ITOFCA, 322 F.3d at 928.
138. See supranote 71 (citing cases for the proposition that the transfer of nonexclusive
licenses is generally proscribed).
139. ITOFCA, 322 F.3d at 931.
140. Id. (citing Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.
1992)).
141. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992). This
reasoning seems to run counter to Copyright Act Section 202, which provides in part:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object... does not of itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object ....
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). Why should possession of negatives imply possession of the right to
use them, given the statutory distinction between the two? As discussed above, Schiller is a
reasonable decision in terms of its analysis of the timing of a work-for-hire agreement. On the
issue of the specificity required in a transfer of copyright, however, Schiller is of more dubious
value.
142. Schiller, 969 F.2d at 413.
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An inefficient standoff created by division of copyright ownership is
admittedly not only unappealing but arguably inconsistent with the
dissemination aims of the Copyright Act. 143 Nor is the Seventh Circuit the only
court that finds such a prospect abhorrent.' 44 Nevertheless, one must ask
whether judicial reluctance to endorse such a situation is appropriate in the
contractual arena. It is one thing to ensure that a statute is construed in a
manner consistent with its objectives; it is another to insist that contracts must
invariably be similarly interpreted. Even if the aims of the Copyright Act are
dissemination-oriented, one may ask whether parties to a contract should not be
free to--perhaps mistakenly or immorally-make an agreement that entails
anti-dissemination results. 145 This is particularly true if, as in Schiller,the court
infers the parties' apparent agreement to a transfer in such manner that the
contract is compatible with economic efficiency and the Copyright Act's
dissemination goals, but arguably inconsistent with the Act's statutory writing
requirement. 146 In Schiller, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Act's
143. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (claiming that copyright is
"intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
144. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968)
(reading a license liberally to permit the licensee to exhibit a film using technology not
specified in the license). The court wrote that:
A further reason favoring the broader view [of the contract's intent] in a case like
this is that it provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work available
to the public over the penumbral medium, whereas the narrower one involves the
risk that a deadlock between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the work's
being shown over the new medium at all. Quite apart from the probable
impracticality, the assignments are broad enough even on plaintiff's view to prevent
the copyright owners from licensing anyone else to make a photoplay for
telecasting. The risk that some May might [sic] find the nation's television screens
bereft of the annual display of"Maytime," interlarded with the usual liberal diet of
commercials, is not one a court can take lightly.
Id.
145. Indeed, as the Supreme Court remarked in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990):
[A] Ithough dissemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act
creates a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of
the copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative works ....
[N]othing in the copyright statutes would prevent an author from hoarding all of his
works during the term of the copyright. In fact, this Court has held that a copyright
owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the
work.
Id. at 228-29.
146. Although Copyright Act Section 204 does not specify that the word "copyright" must
be used in a transfer, Section 202's sharp distinction between ownership of a work and
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Section 204 requires a writing to transfer a copyright; but it decided that the
sales agreement was a writing that could be interpreted as assigning copyright
because it made economic sense to do so.
Similarly, in ITOFCA, the Seventh Circuit declares that ICI (and hence its
transferees) obtained the right to modify and sell the plaintiff's software
because the bankruptcy court said it did and becauseit supposedly needed to as
a matter of economic expediency. 47 Further, to the extent that a written
transfer of copyright was required (which the court states that it was not), 48 the
the asset transfer agreement was sufficiently broad to cover
court finds 1that
49
copyrights.

The court's assertion that no explicit mention of copyrights is necessary
rests on Schiller and on several other cases. As explained above, Schiller's
reasoning on this point is vulnerable. The support provided by the other cases
Judge Posner relies upon is equally attenuated. In S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,
Inc.,150 the court held that a transfer of copyright must be express because as a
matter of federal copyright policy, copyright owners are presumed to retain any
rights that they do not explicitly grant.' 5' In Shugrue v. ContinentalAirlines,
Inc.,' 52 the operative agreement was unambiguous, stating that the transferor
granted all right, title, and interest to its software and that the software was
ownership of the copyright in the work certainly militates against any assumption that a
copyright is transferred along with a work or with any material object. See supra note 141
(discussing this impact of Schiller). For this reason, it seems reasonable to require that some
mention of copyright be made in a transfer of a copyrighted work.
147. ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2003).
148. Id. at 931.
149. Id. This reasoning has some support elsewhere. In John G. Danielson, Inc., v.
Winchester-ConantProps.,Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1(D. Mass. 2002), the court cited Nimmer for
the proposition that "even though a written instrument may lack the terms 'transfer' and
'copyright,' it may suffice to evince [the author's and the transferee's] mutual intent to transfer
the copyright interest." Id.at 11 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 10.03[A][2]). However, as
noted above, Danielsonaddressed a contractual transfer, making this dictum at best. See id.at
5-9 (providing the facts of the case). Moreover, Nimmer continues to say: "But in order to
achieve that result, the writing must be construed to refer to the domain of copyright ownership
rather than to other interests. It also must rise above vagueness to clue the reader into its desired
intent." 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 10.03[A][2]. Nimmer also cites on this point Forastev.
Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234,240 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating the Pamfiloffcriteriafor a Section
204(a) transfer as including: "(1) definition of the subject matter of the agreement; (2) an
indication that the parties have come to that agreement; and (3) a reasonably certain statement of
the essential terms of the agreement;" and referring to other cases requiring that a Section 204(a)
transfer be "clear").
150. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1981).
151. See id. at 1088 (requiring an express transfer of copyright).
152. Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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agreed to be the transferee's property regardless of whether it was
copyrighted.153 Moreover, the Shugrue court pointed out that the absence of an
explicit reference to copyright in a transfer of assets agreement had been
1 54
considered by at least two courts to create a question about transferor intent.
Yet another case relied upon by the ITOFCA Court, Bieg v. Hovnanian
Enterprises,Inc., 55 does not support the court's conclusion. Although Bieg
mentions that a transfer of copyright might be effective despite its omission of
the word "copyright,"' 156 it goes on to say that "any ambiguity in the alleged
transfer must be interpreted in favor of the original copyright holder in order to
57
satisfy the purpose of Section 204(a)."1
The mixed results in its supporting decisions do not bolster ITOFCA's
conclusion that it is unnecessary to use the word "copyright" in a transfer of
assets if copyright is to be properly transferred. 158 As the concurring opinion by
Judge Ripple notes, the bankruptcy order did not clearly establish the nature of
ICI's interest or that of the interest transferred by ICI to the defendant's
predecessor-in-interest.1 59 An underlying reason for that lack of clarity was the
muddiness of the 1986 asset transfer itself. Because "the district court
explicitly stated that the record was unclear as to exactly what property rights
ITOFCA conveyed to ICI under the Asset Agreement,"'160 and given the
ambiguity of the Asset Agreement (which omitted mention not only of
153. See id. at 285 (providing the facts of the case).
154. Id.; see also Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'din
relevant part and rev'd in other respects, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995) and Friedman v. Stacey
Data Processing Servs. Inc., No. 89 C 4444, 1990 WL 172586, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1990)
(finding that a contract reference to "software programs 'in their entirety' [is] not sufficiently
clear to include copyrights in software"); Konigsberg Int'l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th
Cir. 1994) (describing how the writing requirement "forces a party who wants to use the
copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being
transferred and at what price").
155. Bieg v. Hovanian Enters., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 475 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
156. Id. at 480.
157. Id.
158. Although other courts have followed Schiller, they have tended not to include a
detailed analysis of its holding, and some remark that even if Schiller is valid, explicit mention
of copyrights is the better practice. For example, in Papa'sJune Music v. McLean, 921 F.
Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court did not accept that a lyricist's agreement to a 70/30
royalty split necessarily meant that he agreed to a 70/30 ownership split. Id. at 1159. The court
insisted that unless the agreement was clear, it should be construed in favor of the copyright
owner because Section 204 reflects a congressional judgment that copyright owners should
retain their rights unless they specifically transfer them. Id.
159. ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Ripple, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 935 (Ripple, J., concurring).
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"copyright" but also of "software"), 16 1 it appears that the majority opinion is
rather conclusory. Moreover, as Judge Ripple points out, none of the cases on
which the majority relies involved an agreement referring merely to "assets,"
without some reference to "rights," "intangible property," or the tangible
property to which an intangible right attached. 162 The ITOFCA-ICI Asset
Agreement, specifying assets "used and necessary to the freighting business,"
could very plausibly have referred to software used in the business without
including the right to sell that software to third parties. Finally, the concurrence
emphasizes that the inference of a transfer of copyright rights on summary
judgment-from an agreement that fails to mention them-runs counter to
Copyright Act Section 204.163
Because ITOFCA failed to object to ICI's transfer (via the bankruptcy
order) of its rights-which appear to have amounted to a nonexclusive license
to exercise copyright rights-the concurrence reaches the conclusion that
ITOFCA's arguments are precluded.16 Nonetheless, the concurrence appears
to be better reasoned and more consonant with the Copyright Act than the
majority opinion.
In summary, taking into account the legislative intent of Copyright Act
Sections 201 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e), the policy behind the Act's transfer of
ownership provisions in Section 204, and the deficiencies in the decisions
analyzed so far, it appears that a proper statutory reading should confine
transfers by operation of federal law to a narrow range of events. Aside from
the Act's own allocation provisions concerning joint works and works for hire,
this includes transfers by intestate succession, mortgage foreclosure, voluntary
bankruptcy, and other situations that demonstrate implied consent to eventual
transfer under clearly envisioned circumstances. A narrow reading of
"transfers" as requiring evidence of intent on the part of the copyright owner
appears far more consistent with the policy behind the writing requirement and
other arduously negotiated Copyright Act provisions intended to protect authors
from inadvertent loss of their copyright rights. This approach suggests that the
possibility of copyright transfers by operation of law in other contexts should
also be carefully limited.

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. (Ripple, J., concurring).
Id. at 937 Ripple, J., concurring).
Id. at 938 (Ripple, J., concurring).
The concurrence emphasizes that a nonexclusive licensee is not entitled to transfer its

rights without the assent of the copyright owner but finds that ITOFCA's silence at the time of
the bankruptcy proceeding acted as a tacit authorization. Id. at 941 (Ripple, J., concurring).
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B. Transfers of Copyright by Operationof State Law: Divorce and
Community Property
Compared to the relative paucity of academic literature and case law on
involuntary copyright transfers by operation of federal law, state community
property law conflicts with the federal copyright statute provide somewhat
more fertile ground. Most or all of the literature on the subject addresses the
problem of involuntary copyright transfers in the context of divorce
proceedings in community property states. 165 This is the legacy of In re
Marriage of Worth, 166 a California divorce decision holding that an author's
copyright was community property to be shared equally by the author and his
divorced spouse. The Worth court held that since the Copyright Act allows for
transfers by operation of law, California could apply its marital law to transfer
copyright ownership to the author's ex-wife. 167 Interestingly, commentators
appear unanimously to believe-irrespective of their normative stance toward
Worth-that it contravenes both the letter and intent of Section 201 (e) for state
courts to effect involuntary transfers of copyright unless some form of implied
consent can be demonstrated. 68 Indeed, it is worth recalling that this point
is
69
explicit in the legislative history, as well as the text, of Section 201 (e). 1
Nimmer accordingly concludes that, in the Section 201 (e) divorce context,
persons who marry in a community property state' 70 have impliedly consented
165. See generally Dale S. Ciolino, Why CopyrightsAre Not Community Property,60 LA.
L. REv. 127 (1999) (arguing that copyrights are not community property); Peter J. Wong,
Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 1087 (1995)
(agreeing with and trying to bolster In re Marriageof Worth, the leading case on the subject);
Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worthy" Decision: The Characterizationof a Copyright as
Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & EN'T. L.J. 601 (1995) (disagreeing with and
criticizing Worth); Carla M. Roberts, Worthy ofRejection: Copyrightas Community Property,
100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991) (criticizing Worth); Nevins, supranote 90, at 135; David Nimmer,
Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. REv. 383
(1988) (analyzing Worth).

166. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987).
167.

Id. at 139. Worth's reasoning can be distinguished from Tasini's by the fact that in

Tasini, the court purported to apply the Copyright Act itself, rather than a body of state law, to
accomplish the transfer.
168. See Nimmer, supra note 165, at 408 (finding implied consent of copyright transfer
through marriage in a community property state); Nevins, supra note 90, at 392 ("Section

201(d). . . recognizes transfers 'by operation of law .... ' How is this language to be squared
with Section 201(e)? Obviously by reading subsection (e)'s voluntariness requirement into
Subsection (d)(1)."); Polacheck, supra note 165, at 617, 626 (requiring implied consent to
transfer copyright); Wong, supra note 165, at 1101 (same).
169. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140 (1976) (discussing the purposes of the 1976

Copyright Act).
170.

Nimmer also mentions William Patry's idea that implied consent may be based on a
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to possible eventual transfers of their copyright rights by operation of law.'17
Nevins attacks this as tenuous, 172 and in view of the earlier discussion of
transfers and work-for-hire,' 73 it does appear more reasonable to require a
demonstration of intent at least as convincing in the community property sphere
as in any other.
In fact, Worth has also been criticized by other courts. Notably, in
Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,174 the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
held that state community property law which conflicts with the objectives ofa
federal statute should be preempted. 75 Because the Copyright Act vests
copyright ownership initially in the author of a work, 76 the district court held,
77
such ownership cannot vest in both the author and the marital community.
The question therefore is-assuming that the copyright is supposed to be
shared-whether the copyright can be transferred to the community by
operation of law. Rejecting Worth's reasoning on this point, the Rodrigue
district court focused on Section 201(e), citing the legislative history at some
length 178 and emphasizing that
most commentators agree that Section 201 (e) is
179
application.
its
in
expansive

person residing in a community property state. 1 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 6A.03, n.39 (citing
William Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Pre-emption, 8
COMMUNrrY PROP. J. 205, 233 (1981)).
171. Nimmer, supra note 165, at 406,409.
172. See Nevins, supra note 90, at 399 (arguing against implying a consent to involuntary

copyright transfer in community property states). It is interesting that Nimmer appears to
concede this point by terming Patry's theory "even more tenuous" than his own. 1NIMMER,
supra note 46, § 6A.03, n. 39.
173. Regarding joint works, see supra notes 18, 26-32 and accompanying text.
174. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'd on othergrounds
218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
175. Id. at 537-40. This reflects the doctrine of implied or "conflict" preemption, as
opposed to the express preemption articulated in Copyright Act Section 301.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (giving the author the first right to ownership of the
copyright).
177. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.
178. Id. at 542.
179. Id. In doing so, the court also rejected a contrary reading in In re PeregrineEntm 't,
116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990). Although Peregrineheld that Copyright Act Section 201(e)

does not apply in an attachment situation where the "government is merely enforcing private
rights," the language of Section 201 (e) contains nothing to support this conclusion. Id. at 206.
The provision's use of the term "transfer" in addition to "seize" and "expropriate" supports a
broader reading. Peregrine'sinterpretation would seem to revert to the original purpose of the
provision-government expropriation-but does not reflect the consensus that the provision
now has broader effect.
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Consequently, according to the district court, a transfer of copyright
ownership by operation of state family law would be illicit unless it were
voluntary. 18 The question this point raised is whether volition could, in the
author's case, be legitimately inferred. The Rodrigue court referred to the
notion expounded by Nimmer that marrying in a community property state can
imply such consent, 8 ' but it dismissed that concept as having little support in
doctrine. 8 2 In contrast to work for hire, where Congress "expressly provided in
the Act for this type of quasi-assignment of authorship," 8 3 no such provision
for a spousal co-author or quasi-assignee can be found in the statute. On the
whole, said the district court, the conflict between state community law and the
Copyright Act was "irreconcilable," carrying with it a risk of inflicting
substantial damage to the Act's "goals of predictability and certainty of
copyright ownership," among other things.'84 Hence, the district court held that
the Copyright Act preempted Louisiana state law.
On appeal, 8 5 the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an approach
considered but rejected by the lower court was in fact the proper result.18 6 That
is, the court held, the scope of the conflict between federal copyright law and
Louisiana community property law was narrower than it appeared,8 7 and there
was room for the author (George Rodrigue) to retain exclusive "managerial"
control over copyright while allowing the "economic benefits" of the
copyrighted work to belong to the community during the marriage and to the
former spouse in "indivision" thereafter.188 Hence, with the apparent conflict
between federal and state law resolved, there was no need for federal
preemption.
At the basis of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is the assumption that, while
Copyright Act Section 106 delineates six rights,'8 9 "none of these rights either
180. Rodrigue,55 F. Supp. 2d at 543. For a more detailed explanation of this point under
Louisiana community property law (and the federalism issues implied by it), see Ciolino, supra
note 165.
181.

Id.at 543.

182.
183.

Id.
Id.

184.

Id. at 547.

185. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
186. See id. at 434 (disagreeing with the lower court).
187. See id.
at 440 (explaining that state law was not subject to either field preemption or
even to implied preemption based on the general incompatibility of the state statute with the
objectives of federal law; rather, the conflict was resolvable through interpretation of the impact
of the state statute, allowing for reconciliation of the state and federal regimes).
188.

Id. at 435.

189.

The court refers to the Act's "five" rights, id. at 439, because the decision predated by
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expressly or implicitly include the exclusive right to enjoy income or any of the
other economic benefits produced by or derived from copyright." 90 Thus, the
provision by Louisiana community property law of an economic benefit to the
ex-spouse did not conflict with federal law and need not be preempted.' 9'
In arriving at this conclusion, the court engaged in a fairly detailed
exposition of Louisiana (and civil) law property rights as embracing three
separate elements: usus, or the right to use and possess; abusus, or the right to
alienate and transfer; andfructus, or the right to enjoy the income produced by
the property. 92 According to the court, the author-spouse would continue to
hold exclusively the elements of usus and abusus, while the
ex-spouse would
93
share in the continuingfructus rights of the community. 1
While all of this is couched in the language of civil law, it is reminiscent
of the distinction between the legal entitlements ofownership (corresponding to
usus and abusus) and a beneficial right to the economic fruits of ownership
(fructus). The Fifth Circuit assumed that the Copyright Act includes only the
first two and does not address the third. In doing so, the court seemed to
believe that it has found a viable means of reconciling the state and federal
regimes. Upon closer inspection, however, its solution to the problem is
implausible. It is certainly true that ownership of a copyright is distinguishable
from ownership of the income generated by the use or disposition of a
copyrighted work. 194 Royalties are separable from copyrights and are not
subject to the same federal regulation as copyright. 195 At the same time,
however, it is not as though the Copyright Act is indifferent to who receives the
economic benefit of copyrighted works. Indeed, the 1976 Act's revisions
several months the amendment to the Copyright Act adding the right to publicly perform sound
recordings by means of digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
190. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d. at 440.
191. Id. at 436.
192. Id. at 437.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)
("[H]olding a royalty interest does not bespeak an interest in the underlying copyright itself...
[but] an interest in receiving money when the owner of the copyright exploits it.").
195. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
that where copyright owner assigned future royalties and assignee did not record its assignment
that the IRS could not assert that the assignee's interest was unperfected due to lack of federal
recording, because transfers of royalties, as opposed to transfers of copyright, do not have to be
federally recorded in order to be perfected); Papa's June Music v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154,
1160 (1996) ("[A]n agreement concerning royalties does not constitute a 'transfer of copyright
ownership' within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101."); Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests:
Where IntellectualPropertyand CommercialLaw Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1691-95
(1996) (criticizing Peregrine'sconflation of copyrights and the royalties they generate).
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reflected political compromises intended to ensure that authors enjoy the Act's
contemplated benefits while allowing room for licensees and transferees of
copyright (such as publishers and film studios) to enjoy some predictability in
their commercial relations. 96 It therefore appears excessive to assert, as did the
Fifth Circuit, that the right to enjoy the earningofcopyright is "notably absent"
even by implication from the Copyright Act.' 97 References to the earnings
themselves-i.e., money, royalties, etc.-are undeniably absent from the Act,
but the rightto enjoy them is implicitly-and crucially-embedded in the very
notion of copyright rights.' 98 That this is true is manifested not only in the
Act's focus on exclusive rights but also in the statute's provisions regarding
beneficial owners, such as authors who have licensed their copyrighted
works. 99 The Act would hardly include such provisions were it entirely
unconcerned with the economic benefits attendant to copyright exploitation.

196. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750 (1989)
(discussing Congress's interest in commercial predictability).
197. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2000).
198. Had the court held simply that Mrs. Rodrigue was entitled to a certain percentage of
her husband's royalty earnings, rather than sharing his right to receive royalties, perhaps the
preemption question could have been avoided altogether without doing violence to the
Copyright Act. The court, however, did not adequately distinguish between the royalties and
the right to receive them. As one writer states, "[b]ecause revenues were not an exclusive right
mentioned in the definition of 'copyright,' the court concluded that Louisiana law did not
conflict with federal law by recognizing [Mr. Rodrigue's] community interest in proceeds from
sales or licenses of (Mr. Rodrigue's] artwork." Garth R. Backe, Community Propertyand the
CopyrightAct: Rodrigue's Recognitionofa Community Interest in Economic Benefits, 61 LA.

L. REv. 655, 659 (2001). Note the use here of the terms "revenues" and "proceeds"--obviously,
revenues cannot be a "right" like the exclusive right to reproduce a work. Does the author
mean, though, to imply that the right to receive revenues is not exclusive? That would come as
a surprise to the drafters of the Copyright Act. Again, "proceeds" are royalties or sales
income-not the right to receive them. The confusion of royalties and the right to receive them,
however, is not uncommon. See, e.g., Teller v. Teller, 53 P.3d 240, 250 n.22 (Haw. 2002)
(referring to cases that recognize patents and other intellectual property subject to division in a
marital dissolution and including several cases that awarded, or recognized the divisibility, of
royalties); see also Alsenz v. Alsenz, 101 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. App. 2003) ("It is
unquestionable that, had these patents been taken out during the marriage, the patents and the
income they generated would be community property. In this, we would join other jurisdictions
in which the courts treat the incomefrom intellectual property created during marriage as marital
or community property.") (emphasis added). The Alsenz court seems not to have noticed the
difference in the concepts to which it referred. Alsenz has in turn been relied upon for the
proposition that state community property laws are not preempted by federal intellectual
property law. See Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. App. 2004) (discussing
patents).
199. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000) (allowing beneficial owners to sue for
infringement).
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At one point, the court seemed to admit as much. In a convoluted exegesis
of Copyright Act Section 201 (a), the court said that the subsection "never uses
the word 'own' or 'ownership"' but rather provides that copyright "vests" in the
author.2 0 0 It then explained that "vests" means to give a right "of present or
future enjoyment." 20 1 But here, the court stopped short, leaving the reader to
wonder, "enjoyment of what?" According to the court, it is not enjoyment of
economic benefits because-as the court stated-the Copyright Act includes
only five attributes of ownership "while omitting ... the attribute of enjoyment
of economic benefits." 20 2 Thus, the court simultaneously said that Section 201
is about vesting rather than ownership, and that vesting implies a right of
enjoyment, but that vesting does not relate to the enjoyment of economic
benefits. This interpretation would make copyright "ownership" (or "vesting,"
for that matter) rather pallid. 20 3 If Section 201 is about "vesting," and vesting is
about enjoyment, what is to be enjoyed? The knowledge that one has exclusive
rights? The sight of a certificate of copyright registration? It may be true that
the rights described in Section 106 of the Copyright Act do not specify the right
to earn income from their exploitation but that right is implicit in the Act's
raison d'etre. If Section 201 is about the vesting of benefits in the author, as
the court said, then-given the Act's objective of providing economic
incentives to authors2 4-it is unconvincing to say that the Act ignores them
completely.
In other words, while the distinction between copyrights and earnings
from copyrights is a proper one, a distinction between the right to earn income
from a copyright and the exclusive right to exploit a copyright is more
questionable. The Fifth Circuit's failure to distinguish between copyright
income per se (generally not covered by the Act) 20 5 and the right to receive it (a
200.
201.

Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 436.
Id.

202.

Id.

203. For similar conclusions as to the Rodriguecourt's fallacious reasoning with regard to
the Copyright Act, see Dane S. Ciolino, How CopyrightBecame Community Property (SortOJ):
Through the Rodrigue v. Rodrigue Looking Glass, 47 Loy. L. REV. 631 (2001). Professor
Ciolino delivers a stinging critique of the decision that elucidates its incompatibility with
Louisiana law as well as with the Copyright Act, and presents a dizzying array of complications
attendant upon the implementation of the fructus" right bestowed upon the ex-spouse. Id. at
640. Dissecting the types of income produced by copyrighted works (or sales of the works
themselves), Ciolino shows that not only is Rodrigue's analysis faulty, but it also implies
extremely difficult practical problems. Id. at 648-59.
204. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(discussing rationales for the Copyright Act's protections).
205. See supranotes 194-95 and accompanying text (distinguishing between copyright and
royalties).
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rationale of the Act) results in a misinterpretation of the statute. Another way
of putting this is that, in focusing on the Act's non-coverage of royalties, the
Fifth Circuit conflated royalties and the right to royalties, thereby failing to
recognize the Act's concern with copyright as an economic right.206 Indeed, it
would be difficult to see how the Copyright Act could reflect the constitutional
underpinning of economic incentives to authors unless that concern is
acknowledged. The court purports to address this issue, 20 7 but it is not
persuasive: It simply declines to assume that the interests of spouses are so
discordant that one spouse would be disinclined to create if the other had an
interest in the copyright revenues. 20 8 That is not the point, however. The point
is that the federal scheme involves an incentive to create, in the form of the
right to enjoy the economic benefits of creation. The Fifth Circuit's decision to
reallocate that enjoyment to a non-author spouse by operation of state law
interferes with the federal scheme because it does not reflect a voluntary
transfer by the author. Even in a world of perfect marriages, this runs counter
to what Congress intended.
Where does this leave the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rodrigue?
Grounding its decision in Louisiana civil law, the court decided that the
Louisiana Civil Code allows for certain exceptions to its principle of equal
management of community property, 20 9 and that in such cases, while legal
ownership and alienability remain the exclusive rights of one spouse, the
economic benefits are to be shared. 2 10 Next, having assumed that the Copyright
Act is indifferent to the right to enjoy the fruits of copyrighted works'
exploitation, it found that there is no need for federal preemption of the Civil
Code.2 1'
The sole virtue of the Fifth Circuit's approach to the community property
problem is that it did not explicitly embrace a transfer by operation of law of
legal ownership. Rather, its definition of the ex-spouse as usufruct beneficiary
is clearly intended to limit her to the status of a beneficial owner. A beneficial
owner may be a person who does not have legal title to a copyright but is
entitled to certain of the benefits flowing from the copyright (e.g., an author
206. See Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 554,558 (discussing the Copyright Act's recognition
of economic concerns).
207. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2000) (claiming to address
economic considerations).
208. Id. at 440.
209. Id. at 438.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 440. The court repeatedly refers to Copyright Act Section 301 for mysterious
reasons, as it is clear that Section 301, addressing express preemption, is irrelevant.

1050

63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1011 (2006)

who has sold her work for royalties).1 2 Where a party enjoys certain economic
benefits of a copyright, one may recognize a claim to those benefits that falls
short of legal ownership or an implied transfer of such ownership. 213 The
(rather meager) good news in Rodrigue, therefore, is that the Fifth Circuit
stopped short of asserting such a transfer.
On the other hand, even in the absence of explicit endorsement of transfers
of legal ownership by operation of law, the court's decision ultimately means
not only that the spouse has received a share of the author's copyright royalties,
but that usufruct, as one aspect of ownership, is legitimately transferred by
operation of state law. True, the court previously concluded that such a right is
not included in the Copyright Act, and therefore the court did not believe that it
was making such a transfer. Nevertheless, because the Copyright Act is
fundamentally concerned with the right of economic enjoyment, the decision
does just that. This goes too far; it implies precisely what the Copyright Act
proscribes in Section 201(e) as to certain individual authors. In short, Rodrigue
endorses a transfer of copyright rights from the author without his consent, and
in doing so, it legitimates a state law action that frustrates the federal statute's
economic incentive goals-a classic example of a situation justifying federal
preemption of conflicting state law.
Rodrigue is also arguably inconsistent with a number of Supreme Court
decisions respecting community property law, an aspect of the analysis that has
received virtually no attention. In a line of cases beginning with Wissner v.
Wissner,214 the Court has invalidated the application of state community
property laws where they have resulted in allocations of proceeds contrary to
the wishes of policyholders under federally created and funded insurance
programs. In Wissner, the deceased had designated his mother as beneficiary
under a policy provided by the National Service Life Insurance Act, while state
law directed that half of his policy's proceeds were payable to his widow. The
215
In a subsequent decision in
Court held that state law could not be applied.
216
this area, Ridgway v. Ridgway, the Court held similarly that a divorced
212. See, e.g., Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1987)
(describing a beneficial owner as a person who has parted with legal title in exchange for
royalties; asserting that a beneficial owner must claim beneficial interest through the legal
owner); Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that a right to royalties
for exploitation of copyrighted music gives rise to a beneficial interest).
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2004) ("The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of Section 411, to institute an action
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.").
214. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
215. Id. at 660-61.
216. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
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military officer could designate his second wife as beneficiary of his policy
under the Servicemen's Group Life2 17Insurance Act, despite the claims of his first
wife and children under state law.
Another case (subsequent to Wissner but preceding Ridgway), Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos, 2 18 involved allegations of fraud and breach of trust on the part of the
decedent, who had used community property funds to purchase bonds that he
made payable to his brother. 2 19 The Court consequently viewed the bonds as
possibly constituting a device intended to divest the wife of her interests in her
own property.2 In deciding Ridgway, the Court distinguished Yiatchos on the
grounds that there was no allegation of a breach of trust; Yiatchos had used
money that belonged partly to his wife to purchase the bonds, whereas in
Ridgway's case, the decedent had "misdirected property over which he had
exclusive control., 221 The question therefore was a more straightforward one,
i.e., whether the state community property result presented a conflict with
"federal law... [that]... bestow[ed] upon the service member an absolute
right to designate the policy beneficiary. 2 22 The Court went on: "That right is
personal to the member alone. It is not a shared asset subject to the interests of
another, as is community property. 2 23 Moreover, in both Wissner and
Ridgway, the Court was at some pains to emphasize that the insurance
programs in question were intended to enhance the morale of individuals in the
military service,224 i.e., that they were instituted to serve a distinct federal policy
goal.
Several of these points apply to copyrights. First, while an argument can
be made that the salary and benefits-such as insurance-earned by a married
serviceman might be subject to community property rules during his marriage
and should therefore carry some weight as against putatively preemptive federal
rules, 22 1 it is manifest that a copyright is personal to the author, and by statutory
definition, it initially vests in the author alone. Hence, to the extent that the
217. Id. at 60.
218. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
219. Id. at 307-08.
220. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 58 (discussing Yiatchos).
221. Id. at 59 n.8. Despite the use of the term "misdirected," the Court concluded that
Ridgway had acted within his rights.
222. Id. at 58-59.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 56.
225. See, e.g., Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1950) (Minton, J., dissenting)
("[T]he nature of this dispute is a claim by the wife that she is the owner of a half portion of
these proceeds because such proceeds are the fruit of funds originally hers.").
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Court has found that preemption is warranted where the property at stake is an
insurance policy belonging to such married servicemen, its reasoning is a
fortiori more compelling in the copyright setting.
But an even broader point can be made. The federal insurance schemes at
issue in the Wissner/Yiatchos/Ridgway line226 were all centrally concerned with
parties-i.e., beneficiaries--other than the policyholder. That is, the purpose of
those schemes was to provide ownership in the disputed property (the insurance
proceeds) to another party when the policyholder died. In this sense, the
federal regime in question (and the property it controlled) was in essence, and
from the beginning, other-directed. In contrast, the Copyright Act is not
centrally concerned with providing payments to parties other than the author.227
Although it does contain provisions for statutory succession upon the death of
an author,22 8 those provisions are hardly its primary purpose in the same way
that the distribution of post-mortem proceeds constitutes the essence of the
federal plans at issue in Wissner and related cases. Thus, if the Supreme Court
could hold in those cases that the federal interest in preserving the autonomy of
the policyholder's choice trumped the claim of a spouse under community
property law, 229 one could say that (again, afortiori)the federal claim in the
copyright sphere should be even more compelling. In other words, if federal
insurance schemes provide a right to designate a beneficiary that is personal
and not subject to treatment as a shared asset subject to the interests of
another,23 ° one could certainly say the same (and more) about a copyright.
Rodrigue does not delve very deeply into this line of cases, limiting itself
to commenting on Hisquierdo'sremark that state law damage
231 to the federal
policy interest must be major in order to justify preemption.
It neglects to
mention that Hisquierdo preempted state community property law on the
226. In this regard, one must also include Hisquierdov. Hisquierdo,439 U.S. 572 (1979),
which concerned benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act.
227. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
228. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 304, 203 (establishing complex rules for succession to
copyright and termination of interest ownership when an author dies before expiration of the
copyright term).
229. Hart and Wechsler query whether Ridgway too readily discerned the federal interest to
be in conflict with state property law, asking, "Ifsuch insurance policies cannot serve as the
subject of binding family settlements, isn't their value to servicemen reduced?" RICHARD
FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

722

(2003). It is hardly self-evident that this is the value that appeals, or is meant to appeal, to
servicemen. Rather, it would be the idea that after their death their loved ones will be cared for.
230. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46,60 (1981).
231. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966)).
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grounds that even when a spouse helped to support her husband, a pensioner
under the Railroad Retirement Act, her "sole contribution ...[was] to the
marital community that support[ed] the employee who has made railroad
employment a career"-and that was not enough to justify the application of
state community property law.232 The same statement could be made about a
spouse who supports an artist who produces a copyrighted work. The
Copyright Act evinces numerous deliberate congressional choices to vest
ownership in the author and the author alone. 3 If state law impairs that policy
decision (and its corollary that copyright's economic benefits reach the author),
then, as Hisquierdo declares, the federal statute "pre-empts all State law that
stands in its way." 234 In short, Rodrigue is not only of questionable merit in its
reasoning, but also in its conformity with relevant authority.
IV. Conclusion
Individually, any of the cases examined in this Article might appear
aberrant or not overwhelmingly consequential. The Tasini district court's
transmutation of a publisher's privilege into a full-fledged transfer was made
inoperable in that case by the Second Circuit's reversal on other grounds,
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Yet neither the Second Circuit
nor the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the purported transfer by
operation of law. Meanwhile, the Court has declined certiorari in Rodrigue,
which elevated a beneficiary of copyright to ownership status. And the
decision in ITOFCA is not the type of holding that generates a great deal of
debate, despite its having effected a transfer in the complete absence of a
writing mentioning either a transfer or a copyright.235 The cumulative effect of
decisions like these, however, is arguably serious, in that it erodes the clear
legislative intent and express language of a federal intellectual property statute
at a time when the ownership of copyright is economically and commercially
important.23 6 Aside from the authorial rights problem that is clearly raised in
232. Id. at 584.
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (vesting initial ownership rights in the author or
authors); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (ensuring that authorship transfers under work-forhire rules be signed by both the author and the employer).
234. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979).
235. Meanwhile, ITOFCA has been cited as authority for the proposition that "a writing
need not use the term 'copyright' to effectuate a valid transfer." Dick Corp. v. Sho-Lavalin
Constructors, Inc., No. 04 C 1043, 2004 WL 2967556, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004).
236. For example, one report found that the copyright industries (movies, video, music,
publishing, radio, TV, video games, and software) accounted for about 6% of U.S. total GDP
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these cases, there is a broader question involved when doctrine takes a direction
increasingly divergent from what Congress intended when it enacted the
statutory framework for copyrights. Meanwhile, these decisions, rather than
being criticized, are relied upon as though they represent adequate approaches
to the issues they address. For example, Faulkner'sassertion that the issue of
transfers by operation of law was fully analyzed in Tasini2 37 is likely to become
the received wisdom, whereas in fact, the issue was hardly developed at all,
despite the radical nature of the conclusion at which the Tasini district court
arrived. 238 For this reason, there is in fact some urgency to a fuller exploration
of the issues raised in these cases, and rectification of the doctrinal record
where it is necessary and appropriate.

($626.6 billion) and employed 4% of all U.S. workers in 2002. Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright
Industries in the US. Economy: The 2004 Report (International Intellectual Property Alliance),
2004, at i. The copyright industries attained an estimated $89 billion in foreign sales and
exports, leading other industry sectors such as chemicals, motor vehicles, aircraft, and
associated equipment sectors. Id. at ii. "The core copyright industries continue to grow far
faster than the economy as a whole. .... " Id at 11.
237. Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 94 F. Supp. 2d 523, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
238. See supra Part III.A. 1 (discussing in detail the errors of the Tasini Court).
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